testkube-enterprise-api-2.12.2_linux_arm64

digest	sha256:258788c989dfb87b99c24e7318ac04226bcfdc7388577a8c7d28fabfdfcabc6c
vulnerabilities
platform	linux/arm64
size	77 MB
packages	341

github.com/docker/docker 28.5.2+incompatible (golang) pkg:golang/github.com/docker/docker@28.5.2%2Bincompatible Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel Affected range <29.3.1 Fixed version 29.3.1 CVSS Score 8.8 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H EPSS Score 10.140% EPSS Percentile 95th percentile Description Summary A security vulnerability has been detected that allows attackers to bypass authorization plugins (AuthZ) under specific circumstances. The base likelihood of this being exploited is low. This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-41110. Impact If you don't use AuthZ plugins, you are not affected. Using a specially-crafted API request, an attacker could make the Docker daemon forward the request to an authorization plugin without the body. The authorization plugin may allow a request which it would have otherwise denied if the body had been forwarded to it. Anyone who depends on authorization plugins that introspect the request body to make access control decisions is potentially impacted. Workarounds If unable to update immediately: Avoid using AuthZ plugins that rely on request body inspection for security decisions. Restrict access to the Docker API to trusted parties, following the principle of least privilege. Credits 1seal / Oleh Konko (@1seal) Cody (c@wormhole.guru) Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada (@manizada) Resources CVE-2024-41110 / GHSA-v23v-6jw2-98fq Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition Affected range <=28.5.2 Fixed version Not Fixed CVSS Score 7.2 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H EPSS Score 0.104% EPSS Percentile 1st percentile Description Summary A race condition during docker cp mount setup allows a malicious container to redirect a bind mount target to an arbitrary host path, potentially overwriting host files or causing denial of service. Details When copying files into a container, the daemon sets up a temporary filesystem view by bind-mounting volumes into a private mount namespace. During this setup, the mount destination is created inside the container root and then a bind mount is attached using the container-relative path resolved to an absolute host path. Between mountpoint creation and the mount() syscall, a process running inside the container can replace the destination (or a parent path component) with a symlink pointing to an arbitrary location on the host. The mount() syscall follows the symlink, causing the volume to be bind-mounted onto an arbitrary host path instead of the intended container path. Impact A malicious container can redirect a volume bind mount to an arbitrary host path. The impact depends on the volume content and mount options: If the volume is writable, arbitrary host files at the redirected path could be overwritten with the volume's contents. If the volume is read-only, the host path is masked by the mount for the duration of the operation, causing denial of service. In all cases the mount is temporary (torn down after the docker cp completes), but the effects of any writes persist. Conditions for exploitation A container must have at least one volume mount. A process inside the container must be able to rapidly create and swap symlinks at the volume mount destination path. An operator must initiate a docker cp into that container, or call the PUT /containers/{id}/archive or HEAD /containers/{id}/archive API endpoints. Not affected Containers that do not have volume mounts are not affected, as the race occurs during volume bind-mount setup. Workarounds Only run containers from trusted images. Avoid using docker cp with untrusted running containers. Use authorization plugins to restrict access to the archive API endpoints (PUT /containers/{id}/archive, HEAD /containers/{id}/archive). Uncontrolled Search Path Element Affected range <=28.5.2 Fixed version Not Fixed CVSS Score 7.2 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N EPSS Score 0.161% EPSS Percentile 6th percentile Description Summary When a user uploads a compressed archive into a container, a malicious image can execute arbitrary code with daemon (host root) privileges. Details When handling PUT /containers/{id}/archive requests with compressed archives, the daemon decompresses them using external system binaries. Due to incorrect ordering of operations, these binaries are resolved from the container's filesystem rather than the host's. A container image that includes a trojanized decompression binary can achieve code execution as the daemon process whenever a compressed archive is uploaded to that container. The executed binary runs with the daemon's full privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities. Impact Arbitrary code execution as host root, crossing the container-to-host trust boundary. Conditions for exploitation A user must run a container from a malicious image that contains a trojanized decompression binary. The user must then upload a compressed archive (xz or gzip) into that container, either by piping a compressed archive via docker cp - or by calling the PUT /containers/{id}/archive API directly with compressed content. Not affected Standard docker cp usage is not affected, because the CLI sends uncompressed tar by default: docker cp ./file.txt mycontainer:/file.txt This can only be exploited when explicitly passing a xz or gzip-compressed archive to docker cp or the PUT /containers/{id}/archive API, for example: cat archive.tar.xz | docker cp - mycontainer:/dir Decompression formats using pure Go implementations (bzip2, zstd, and gzip when the container image does not contain an unpigz binary) are also not affected. Workarounds Only run containers from trusted images. Use authorization plugins to limit access to the PUT /containers/{id}/archive endpoint. Avoid piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images. Off-by-one Error Affected range <29.3.1 Fixed version Not Fixed CVSS Score 6.8 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N EPSS Score 0.387% EPSS Percentile 32nd percentile Description Summary A security vulnerability has been detected that allows plugins privilege validation to be bypassed during docker plugin install. Due to an error in the daemon's privilege comparison logic, the daemon may incorrectly accept a privilege set that differs from the one approved by the user. Plugins that request exactly one privilege are also affected, because no comparison is performed at all. Impact If plugins are not in use, there is no impact. When a plugin is installed, the daemon computes the privileges required by the plugin's configuration and compares them with the privileges approved during installation. A malicious plugin can exploit this bug so that the daemon accepts privileges that differ from what was intended to be approved. Anyone who depends on the plugin installation approval flow as a meaningful security boundary is potentially impacted. Depending on the privilege set involved, this may include highly sensitive plugin permissions such as broad device access. For consideration: exploitation still requires a plugin to be installed from a malicious source, and Docker plugins are relatively uncommon. Docker Desktop also does not support plugins. Workarounds If unable to update immediately: Do not install plugins from untrusted sources Carefully review all privileges requested during docker plugin install Restrict access to the Docker daemon to trusted parties, following the principle of least privilege Avoid relying on plugin privilege approval as the only control boundary for sensitive environments Credits Reported by Cody (c@wormhole.guru, PGP 0x9FA5B73E) Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition Affected range <=28.5.2 Fixed version Not Fixed CVSS Score 6.1 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H EPSS Score 0.108% EPSS Percentile 1st percentile Description Summary A race condition during docker cp mount setup allows a malicious container to create empty files or directories at arbitrary absolute paths on the host filesystem. This advisory covers the race during mountpoint creation. The related race during the subsequent mount syscall is tracked in GHSA-rg2x-37c3-w2rh Details When copying files into a container, the daemon sets up a temporary filesystem view by bind-mounting volumes into a private mount namespace. During this setup, the mount destination path is first resolved within the container's root filesystem using GetResourcePath, and then used to create the mountpoint (file or directory) if it does not already exist via createIfNotExists. Between path resolution and mountpoint creation, a process running inside the container can swap a path component for a symlink pointing to an arbitrary location on the host. Because createIfNotExists operates on the already-resolved absolute path using standard os.MkdirAll and os.OpenFile — which follow symlinks in intermediate path components — the symlink is followed and the file or directory is created outside the container root filesystem, as root. Impact A malicious container can create empty files or directories at arbitrary absolute paths on the host filesystem, running as root. This enables persistent denial of service — for example: Converting /etc/docker/daemon.json into a directory prevents the daemon from restarting Creating /etc/nologin prevents user logins Overwriting critical system paths with empty files can break host services The container does not gain read or write access to existing host files — only the ability to create new empty files or directories at chosen paths. Conditions for exploitation A container must be running with a process that can rapidly create and swap symlinks at a volume mount destination path. An operator must initiate a docker cp into that container, or call the PUT /containers/{id}/archive or HEAD /containers/{id}/archive API endpoints. Not affected Containers that do not have volume mounts are not affected, as the race occurs during volume bind-mount setup. Patches Mountpoint creation is now scoped to the container root using os.Root (Go 1.24+), which refuses to follow symlinks that escape the opened root directory. All filesystem operations in createIfNotExists (MkdirAll, OpenFile) are performed through the os.Root handle, so even if a symlink swap occurs after path resolution, the creation stays confined to the container root. Workarounds Only run containers from trusted images. Avoid using docker cp with untrusted running containers. Use authorization plugins to restrict access to the archive API endpoints (PUT /containers/{id}/archive, HEAD /containers/{id}/archive).

github.com/go-git/go-git/v5 5.19.1 (golang) pkg:golang/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5@5.19.1 Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following') Affected range <=5.19.1 Fixed version 5.19.2 CVSS Score 7.1 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L EPSS Score 0.292% EPSS Percentile 22nd percentile Description Impact A symlink traversal issue in go-git could allow worktree operations to modify files outside the intended worktree path. The worktreeFilesystem wrapper rejected dangerous path strings, including paths containing .git, parent-directory components, or control characters. However, it did not prevent filesystem operations from following symbolic links that were already present in the worktree. As a result, a path that is safe when evaluated as a string could still resolve into the repository's Git metadata directory. For example, if s is a symbolic link to .git, writing to s/config would modify .git/config. A symbolic link at the final path component could also be followed. For example, if s points directly to .git/config, opening s for writing with truncation could overwrite the repository configuration. Exploitation requires an attacker to be able to introduce or control a symbolic link in the worktree and cause the application to perform a write through that path. Applications using storage/memory for their Storer, or go-billy/memfs for their Worktree, are not affected by this vulnerability. Patches The issue has been addressed by making the worktree filesystem wrapper a symlink-safe boundary. Worktree operations now reject paths where an existing symbolic link in any path component could cause the operation to escape the intended worktree location, including symbolic links at the final component. Users of filesystem-backed worktrees should upgrade to a patched version. Credits Thanks to @kodareef5 for reporting this issue and working with the go-git security team toward its resolution. 🥇 We would also like to thank @HughLewis20, who independently reported the same issue while a fix was already in progress. Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') Affected range <=5.19.1 Fixed version 5.19.2 CVSS Score 6.3 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L EPSS Score 0.349% EPSS Percentile 28th percentile Description Impact A path traversal issue in go-git could allow malicious reference names to access files outside the repository's intended reference storage. Loose references are stored under .git/<reference-name>. The reference name was previously used as a path without verifying that the resolved path remained within the reference storage. A name such as refs/heads/../../config could therefore resolve to unrelated repository metadata such as .git/config or .git/HEAD. A malicious Git server could advertise such a reference name. The name may also survive refspec mapping; for example, it could be mapped to refs/remotes/origin/../../config during a clone or fetch operation. This vulnerability affects filesystem-backed repositories using the storage/filesystem package and its dotgit reference storage. Users relying exclusively on the in-memory storage implementation, storage/memory, are not affected, because reference names are not resolved as filesystem paths. Exploitation requires an application using go-git with filesystem-backed storage to interact with a malicious Git server or otherwise process attacker-controlled reference names. Patches The issue has been addressed by validating reference names at the dotgit storage entry points and rejecting names whose resolved paths could escape the reference storage. Users of filesystem-backed storage should upgrade to a patched version. Workarounds Applications that exclusively use storage/memory are not affected and do not require a workaround for this vulnerability. For applications using filesystem-backed storage, avoid cloning from or fetching from untrusted Git servers until an upgrade is possible. Applications that directly construct or process reference names may also validate them before passing them to filesystem-backed go-git storage. Application-level validation should only be considered a temporary mitigation and does not replace upgrading to a patched version. References Fixes: https://github.com/go-git/go-git/pull/2247 https://github.com/go-git/go-git/pull/2254 Credits Thanks to @Saku0512 for reporting this issue and @Sahana2524 for proposing the initial fix. 🙇

github.com/docker/cli 29.6.2+incompatible (golang) pkg:golang/github.com/docker/cli@29.6.2%2Bincompatible Affected range >=19.03.0+incompatible Fixed version Not Fixed EPSS Score 0.472% EPSS Percentile 39th percentile Description Docker CLI Plugins: Uncontrolled Search Path Element Leads to Local Privilege Escalation on Windows in github.com/docker/cli

golang.org/x/crypto 0.55.0 (golang) pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@0.55.0 Affected range >=0 Fixed version Not Fixed Description The golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp package is unsafe by design, has numerous known security issues, is not maintained, and should not be used. If you are required to interoperate with OpenPGP systems and need a maintained package, consider github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/openpgp which is a maintained fork that aims to be a drop-in replacement for this package.

github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3 3.3.0 (golang) pkg:golang/github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3@3.3.0 Affected range <3.4.0 Fixed version 3.4.0 EPSS Score 0.178% EPSS Percentile 8th percentile Description GoFiber never set HSTS header in helmet middleware due to incorrect protocol check in github.com/gofiber/fiber

github.com/chrismellard/docker-credential-acr-env 0.0.0-20230304212654-82a0ddb27589 (golang) pkg:golang/github.com/chrismellard/docker-credential-acr-env@0.0.0-20230304212654-82a0ddb27589 Affected range >=0 Fixed version Not Fixed Description In github.com/chrismellard/docker-credential-acr-env/pkg/credhelper, the regular expression used by isACRRegistry to validate Azure Container Registry hostnames is unanchored. As a result, arbitrary hostnames containing the substring ".azurecr.io" (such as evil.azurecr.io.attacker.com) are treated as valid ACR registries, causing ACRCredHelper.Get to send the Azure Active Directory (AAD) access token to attacker-controlled hosts.